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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
prescribed by law for those inhabitants, who, by reason of age, infirmity or
misfortune, may have claims upon the sympathy and aid of society." It is
argued, with merit, that people who voluntarily leave their employment
are not beset with a misfortune which gives them a claim upon the sym-
pathy of society. But what about the families of such people? Certainly the
family of a man who is simply shiftless should not be and is not denied
aid or granted only one-half of the assistance necessary to meet a minimum
subsistence compatible with decency and health. The family of a man
participating in an ill-timed or prolonged strike is enduring as much mis-
fortune as anyone else if there is not amply food for the table.
G. RICHARD DZIVI
CRIMINAL LAW-MoTIoN FOR MISTRIA 1-- ExcLusIvE CHARACTER OF
CRIMINAL CODE--Defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree.
During the course of the trial, on four different occasions, the court denied
defendant's motions to direct a mistrial on grounds of improper questions
by the prosecuting attorney and of allegedly prejudicial testimony of a wit-
ness. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The denial
of the motions for mistrial was not error where the prejudicial effect of the
testimony and questions was cured by the trial judge's admonitions to the
jury. State v. Straight, 347 P.2d 482 (Mont. 1959).
Implied in the decision of the instant case is a recognition of the per-
missibility of a motion for mistrial, a motion not provided for by statute.
The court said, in passing, "Regarding the propriety of a motion for mis-
trial, see Hayward v. Richardson Construction Company."
Dictum in the Hayward case,' decided at the same time, expressly ap-
proved the motion for mistrial in civil cases and overruled an earlier case
which had held that "there is no authority in this state for making such a
motion, based on such grounds, nor any for a trial to make such an order,
on such grounds."' Justice Angstman in the Hayward case declared the
earlier decision to be contrary to the rule recognized throughout the country,
and announced the correct rule to be as follows :'
Whenever it appears that there has been such misconduct in a trial,
or prejudicial matter has been allowed to go to the jury, without
opportunity to object in advance, the effect of which cannot be re-
moved by an admonition on the part of the court, the aggrieved
party may move the court to declare a mistrial. Failing in that, he
will be deemed to have taken his chances with the jury.
In contrast, Justice Bottomly dissented from the majority statement
of the rule on the ground that there is no statutory provision in this state
1Instant case at 487.
'347 P.2d 475 (Mont. 1959).
'Robinson v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 80 Mont. 431, 443, 261 Pac. 253, (1927).
'Supra note 2 at 480.
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for "either a motion for mistrial nor any statutory authority for a judge
to declare a mistrial as in some other states. "' He added that the majority
of the court was assuming legislative prerogatives by initiating such a
procedure.
The instant case, which in context with the Hayward case clearly means
to approve the use of the motion for mistrial in criminal case over Justice
Bottomly's objection that such motion is not provided for by statute, raises
once more the issue to what extent the procedural provisions in the Montana
criminal code are complete and exclusive. Seven years earlier, in State v.
Bosch,' the Montana Supreme Court, spealing through Justice Bottomly,
enunciated the doctrine that the Montana criminal code is complete and,
therefore, if a given procedure is not authorized by statute the trial court
has no power to use it. Scrutiny of the case shows that this was only dictum,
but as in the Hayward case, it was explicit dictum and was accompanied by
the express overruling of prior inconsistent cases.
The statement in the Bosch case was made with reference to the
propriety of using bills of particulars, which have neither statutory nor
specific constitutional authorization. Although the court had, at various
times earlier, declared the bill to be a commendable discretionary practice,'
a "right,"' and a right guaranteed by the Montana Constitution,' its dictum
in the -Bosch case, expressly declared that no such bill could be ordered by
the courts and overruled the earlier cases to the contrary. The court said :'
We hold that in this state, where our Criminal Code is complete,
and the legislature has designated specifically each step in the
criminal procedure and practice, there is no authority for a demand
for, nor for an order, requiring the furnishing of a bill of particu-
lars. There is nothing to move the discretion of a trial court. Either
every defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars as a matter of
law, or where there is no law authorizing the same, no defendant is
entitled to it.
The quoted language seems broad enough to exclude any procedure in a
criminal action not expressly provided for in the code.
Despite the position taken in the Bosch case, however, several pro-
cedures and motions not provided for in the statutes have received recog-
nition by the Montana Supreme Court. Among these are the withdrawal
of a plea of guilty after judgment has been rendered, the right of review
by the writ of error coram nobis, the pre-trial motion to supress evidence,
and the motion for mistrial, already 1iPi1c.r
No provision is made in the code which will allow a defendant to with-
"Id. at 481.
'125 Mont. 566, 242 P.2d 477 (1952).
'State v. Gondeiro, 82 Mont. 530, 541, 268 Pac. 507, 511 (1928).
'State v. Shannon, 95 Mont. 280, 26 P.2d 360 (1933).
'State ew rel. Wong Sun v. District Court, 112 Mont. 153, 156, 113 P.2d 996, 997
(1941).
"Supra note 6 at 588, 242 P.2d at 488. Those cases expressly overruled by the court,
however, did not include the Wong Sun decision (supra note 9). This is a dis-
concerting omission since Wong Sun was the most recent decision and the one which
elevated the right to a bill of particulars to a constitutional guarantee,
1960]
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draw a plea of guilty after judgment has been rendered. The statute" pro-
vides in part: "The court may, at any time before judgment, upon a plea
of guilty, permit it to be withdrawn, and a plea of not guilty substituted."
(Emphasis added.) In construing this provision the Montana court, in
State ex rel. Foot v. District Court, stated :" "It is our opinion that a
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty and substitute therefor one of not
guilty, either before or after judgment, is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court." The court construed the clear legislative limitation that
the motion must be made before judgment not to bar those motions made
after judgment. This procedure was allowed in several other decisions both
before' and after" the Bosch case.
Coram nobis, also, is not provided for in the code. This writ was al-
together unknown to Montana law until 1951 when the court apparently
assumed its availability in the case of State v. Hales.' Hales, serving a prison
term for the crime of grand larceny, submitted papers in the nature of a writ
of error coram nobis to the Supreme Court. The court noted that proper
application for such a writ is to the court which rendered the judgment and
ordered the petition forwarded to the trial court without further comment.
Although in a later case' the writ was denied, it was upon grounds other
than the exclusive character of the code, and Justice Davis, referring to
coram nobis, conceded :"
It may be that where the legislature has not spelled out the regula-
tions and limitations, which are to bound our jurisdiction, we may
act consistent with our own concept of the authority given this
court by the Constitution ... It is undoubtedly true also that if
the case is exigent, this court may act to meet the emergency,
even though the legislature has prescribed regulations adequate to
review the ordinary case by appeal, i.e., by framing and issuing
its own original writ to fit the case.
Furthermore, in an original proceeding before the Montana Supreme Court
in September, 1959, one Blakeslee, an inmate of the state prison, petitioned
the court for a "Writ of Coram Nobis. ' The court denied the petition
but without prejudice to his right to apply to the district court for the
same relief. Thus the Montana court remains willing to admit the avail-
ability of coram nobis in criminal practice."
The pre-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained by an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure is another extra-statutory procedure existing in
1REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-6803.
"81 Mont. 495, 503, 263 Pac. 979, 982 (1928).
'E.g., State v. McAllister, 96 Mont. 348, 30 P.2d 821 (1934) ; State v. Casaras, 104
Mont. 404, 66 P.2d 774 (1937).
"E.g., State v. Morgan, 131 Mont. 58, 307 P.2d 244 (1957).
15124 Mont. 614, 230 P.2d 960 (1951). See Briggs, "Coram Nobi8"-Is It Either an
Available or the Most Satisfactory Post-Conriction Remedy to Test Constitutionality
in Criminal Proceedings?, 17 MONT. L. REv. 160, 167 (1956).
"State v. Zumwalt, 129 Mont. 529, 291 P.2d 257 (1955).
'Id. at 534, 291 P.2d at 260.
"Petition of Blakeslee, 343 P.2d 564 (Mont. 1959).
"Although this writ is technically civil in its nature, it has always been used ex-
clusively in connection with criminal proceedings in a manner somewhat similar
to habeas corpus which, though civil, is embodied in the criminal code.
[Vol. 21,
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Montana. The right to suppress illegally obtained evidence could be given
effect by objection to introduction of the evidence at trial, as is done in
other states.' But in Montana, despite omission by the criminal code of
mention of any such pre-trial motion, a failure to make it will ordinarily
constitute a waiver of the constitutional right to exclusion." Placing such
weight on pre-trial procedures which do not appear in the code is, to say
the least, inconsistent with any conception that our criminal code is com-
plete and exclusive.
While there may be basis for some distinctions among them, in total
the instances described above indicate a clear disregard of the position of
the Bosch case that the criminal code is exclusive in denominating pro-
cedures which may be used. Whether the Bosch case should stand to bar the
ordering of a bill of particulars may even be open to question, but in any
event the broad language of that decision has not controlled the Montana
Supreme Court in its rulings with respect to other non-statutory procedures.
MELVYN M. RYAN
EQUITr-APPEALS FROM EQUITY DECREES-SCOPE OF APPELLATE Pu-
vmw-Plaintiff brought an action to enforce a judgment lien against real
property standing in the name of the wife of the judgment debtor. De-
fendants' evidence was not materially contradicted and tended to show that
funds of the wife were used to buy the property. The district court, sitting
without a jury, found for the defendants. On appeal to the Montana
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. In an equity case if the record contains
substantial evidence supporting the findings of the trial court the Supreme
Court will not interfere with those findings. Beard v. Myers, 347 P.2d
719 (Mont. 1959) (Justice Adair concurring in the result).
Prior to 1903, appeals from equity decrees were considered on review
under the same rules as appeals from judgments at law. Findings of fact
made by a judge sitting without a jury were allowed to stand on appeal
if there was evidence to support them.'
In 1903 the statute providing for appellate review' was amended' to
provide as follows: "In equity cases, and in matters and proceedings of
an equitable nature, the Supreme Court shall review all questions of fact
arising upon the evidence presented in the record . . . and determine the
2'See Note, Procedures for Suppressing Illegally Seized Evidence, 20 MONT. L. REV.
225, 233 (1959).
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) appeared to base the right to suppress
in federal courts on a constitutional basis. State v. Gardner, 74 Mont. 377, 240
Pac. 984 (1925) did the same in Montana. While the case of Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949) has cast doubt upon the constitutional basis for the federal rule,
the Gardner rule has been repeatedly applied in Montana without any questioning
of its basis.
'McCauley v. Tyler, 11 Mont. 51 (1891).
'Then Mont. Code of Civ. Proc. 1895, § 21, now REvIsED CODEs OF MONTANA, 1947,
§ 93-216.
%Laws of Montana 1903, Second Extraordinary Session, ch. 1,
19601
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